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Joseph Leigh
London School of Economics and Political Science
Abstract Recent works on ‘uneven and combined development’ (UCD) have focused
on its contributions to the study of political economy and geopolitics, but they have yet
to systematically address the cultural dimension of social change — the socially shared
ideas by which people understand and act upon the world. The present article addresses
this lacuna by applying the premises of UCD to the nineteenth-century emergence of
Occidentalism: the idea of ‘the West’ as the dominant site of culture, civilisation and
modernity. Against the problems of methodological internalism and Eurocentrism, I
argue that the categories of unevenness and combined development provide critical
entry points for an examination of the international construction of ‘Western’ identities
and discourses during the late-nineteenth century imperial era. Specifically, I advance a
theory of geocultural feedback which locates the constituting terms of those identities
and discourses in a specific conjuncture of global unevenness: how the experience of
‘relative backwardness’ in late-industrialising societies translated into self-consciously
‘Westernising’ projects of catch-up development which destabilised prevailing
conceptions of white European supremacy. In both the British and American empires,
this historical dynamic produced a distinct pattern of cultural transformation: a
reactive discourse of civilisational closure centred on the defence of ‘the West.’
1. Introduction: the logic of culture and the logic of the international
Transportation has become so convenient these days that once the wind of Western
civilisation blows to the East, every blade of grass and every tree in the East follow what
the Western wind brings.
—Fukazawa Yukichi, ‘Goodbye Asia,’ 1885 ([1885] 2015, 351)
In nineteenth-century Asia, the image of ‘Western civilisation’ was a central part
of efforts to meet the challenge of global modernity (Aydin 2007). The idea of a
culturally and politically distinctive ‘Western world,’ a notion that did not exist
in any systematic form prior to the 1870s (Bonnett 2017; GoGwilt 1995), now
became a central marker of ‘progress,’ ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’ — a repertoire
of terms which expressed the widely-felt imbalances of an emergent
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international order (Zarakol 2011, 54). To envision Asia’s ‘Westernisation’ was
thus to think globally about differentials of power and prestige that were novel
yet inexorable features of the evolving industrial period (Osterhammel 2014, 87).
It was to engage, fundamentally, in a global transformation of cultural life with
the international relations of power and difference at its heart.
Yet, among the keywords of modern social science, few terms have been so
routinely and consistently associated with the ‘internal history of society’ as
that of culture (Tenbruck 1994). The inherited conceptual pairing of ‘national
identity’ and ‘national culture,’ forged during the nineteenth century
(Goswami 2002), provides a concrete illustration of this prevalent conceptual
framing: the idea of ‘the cultural’ as a purely endogenous social space, often
virtually synonymous with the identities and symbols of a bounded national
homeland (cf. Gilroy 1993, 2–5). This domestication of culture reflects, in part,
the methodological nationalism of much contemporary social science, that is, its
tendency to identify the nation-state as the default unit of social analysis and
thereby occlude the international, geopolitical, and intersocietal dimensions of
social change (Wimmer and Schiller 2003; Beck 2007). More generally, how-
ever, it is best understood as an expression of methodological internalism: the
assumption, inherited from the conceptual models of classical sociology and
anthropology, that all social phenomena can be explained by reference to the
endogenous features of a given society or form of civilisation (Rosenberg
2006). Articulated perhaps most clearly in Weber’s sociology of world reli-
gions, this internalist schema treats cultural systems as historically and terri-
torially discrete units of comparison, obscuring the ways international, global
and geopolitical processes help structure the production of collective identities
(Weber 1991, Part III). From the same internalist premise, Durkheim conceived
domestic social structures as the determinant of social value systems and reli-
gious beliefs, locating the drivers of cultural development within a territorially
bounded ‘national life’ (Durkheim 2008, 315–17, 322). On a similar basis, Levi-
Strauss defined the task of structural anthropology as the analysis of a soci-
ety’s endogenous symbolic systems through the comparative study of distinct
national or tribal orders (Levi-Strauss 1963, 296).1 As these examples illustrate,
the tacit framework of methodological internalism has exercised a deep influ-
ence on the development of modern social science. While such intrinsically
intersocietal processes as conquest, trade, and intellectual exchange have pro-
foundly shaped the history of culture and ideas (Barkawi and Lawson 2017),
their significance has rarely been incorporated into any formal theorisation of
sociocultural development. Rather, scholars of International Relations (IR) have
tended to import their theories of culture from sociology and anthropology
(Neumann 1998, 1–37) — disciplines predicated on ‘single-society’ models of
social and cultural change (Rosenberg 2016a).
In recent decades, the problem of internalism has become the object of
intense criticism: the rise of postcolonial theory, in particular, has served to
thematise the ‘colonial encounter’ as a historically-generative experience of
1 In this connection, it is notable that Levi-Strauss’s (1963, 363–365) account of ‘The Particular
Task of Anthropology’ — defined by its scientific method of comparison, its conceptions of
‘totality’ and ‘system’, and its investigation of ‘non-civilised’ or ‘non-industrial’ societies —
proceeds without any discussion of the interactive social and cultural relations which characterised
the colonial origins of anthropological thought (cf. Steinmetz 2007).
2 Joseph Leigh
inter-cultural transformation and intellectual production (Bhabha 1994; Said
2003). The central thrust of this scholarship highlights the necessity of a prop-
erly intersocietal form of social theory and international studies — one that
would more adequately theorise the interactive coexistence of modern cultural
systems, ideologies, and mentalities (Go 2012; Bhambra 2014; Murray 2019).
Still, many of the most basic theoretical and methodological questions raised
by this task remain significantly under-analysed. What role does the inter-
action between societies play in the development of cultural systems? Is there
such a thing as a distinctively intersocietal dimension to the history of ideas
and cultural production? What factors might comprise such a concept, and
through what kinds of causal mechanisms does it operate?
In what follows, I shall address these questions through the lens of ‘uneven
and combined development’ (UCD). In line with the aims of this Special Issue,
I seek to explore the frontiers of UCD by applying its core premises to an area
of inquiry that has been somewhat neglected in the existing literature: the
dynamics of cultural development — meaning cumulative change in the
socially shared ideas, identities, and symbolic systems by which historical
agents understand and act upon the world (Little 2010, 198–99). While it is
now properly recognised that culture represents a constitutive dimension of
social structure and historical change (Kane 1991, 62ff; Steinmetz 1999, 24–26;
Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 22–25; Sewell 2005, 81–174; Adams,
Clemens, and Orloff 2005, 22ff), the UCD scholarship has recently begun to
address questions of cultural transformation (Anievas and Nişancıoglu 2015;
Davidson 2019; Christie and Degirmencioglu 2019), and the theory’s contribu-
tion to the study of collective identities and meaning systems therefore
remains underspecified. Indeed, although a number of studies highlight the
empirical significance of cultural and ideational processes (see, especially,
Shilliam 2009a, 15–19; 2009b, 77ff; Cooper 2015, 482–83, 485–87; Deckard et al.
2015, 6; Anievas and Nişancıoglu 2015, 111–15, 122–28, 159–60; Davidson 2019,
179–80, 193–94), this literature has not systematically theorised the cultural
dimension of UCD as a historical process, with the most extensive theoretical
applications of the idea concentrated on economic and geopolitical dynamics
(Rosenberg 2013a; Anievas 2014).This range of focus clearly reflects the
theory’s origins in Trotsky’s account of the differentiated ‘tendencies of world
development’ under capitalism (Trotsky [1928] 1996, 41–45; [1932] 2017, 4–6).
However — it is necessary to emphasise — the very idea of UCD represents a
substantial revision to the classical theses of historical materialism, rather than
an uncritical defence of them (Rosenberg 2019). Its central categories — multi-
plicity, unevenness, interaction and combination — reconceptualise social
change as inherently multi-linear and intersocietal, grounding an internationally-
oriented conception of historical development that was critically absent from
the categories of classical Marxism (Rosenberg 2016a; also, Berki 1971;
Davenport 2013).
In this respect, UCD’s theoretical implications may reach significantly
beyond its local applications in the field of socioeconomic and geopolitical ana-
lysis (pace Ashman 2009; Davidson 2009; Rioux 2015). Indeed, since the gen-
eral thrust of UCD is to recover the significance of ‘the international’ as a
dimension of historical causality, its conceptual architecture arguably entails
the possibility of a properly intersocietal conception of sociocultural
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development — one that would systematically address the problems of inter-
nalism highlighted by existing critiques of methodological nationalism and
Eurocentrism (cf. Go 2012; Matin 2013). This potential can be grasped if one
considers the underlying premises of UCD as a social theory:
1. The social world is constitutively uneven: it is comprised of a multiplicity of
societies differentiated by their experiences and levels of social
development of all kinds (economic, military, cultural, and so on).
2. The coexistence of societies entails their interaction: the intersocietal
character of the social world gives rises to a multiplicity of forms of
combined development.
3. The combined nature of societies is a central feature of their development:
the patterns of world history cannot be understood without incorporating
the interactional logics that comprise international/intersocietal relations
(Rosenberg 2016b).
In the next section of the article, I present this set of ontological and meth-
odological premises as a basis for overcoming the problems of methodological
internalism in sociocultural analysis. In particular, I suggest that the central
categories of UCD can help identify the intersocietal causal mechanisms of cul-
tural development: the ways in which the coexistence of unevenly developing
societies creates a range of pressures, influences, and existential circumstances
that shape the production of socially shared ideas. If this claim holds, it fol-
lows that within the conceptual architecture of UCD lies a genuinely ‘global
historical sociology’ (Go and Lawson 2017) focused on the interactional forma-
tion of societies and cultures across space and time.
The theoretical foundations of this argument are concretely elaborated
through a historical study of modern geocultures. Specifically, I shall analyse
the emergence of ‘the West’ as a distinct principle of collective identification
and cultural signification during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth cen-
tury era of the New Imperialism, ca. 1880–1914. While the wider lineages of
this Occidentalist cultural discourse can be traced to earlier historical periods
— especially the processes of conquest and settler colonialism which marked
European expansion in the Americas (Todorov 1999; Anghie 2005; Bowden
2009) — a wide range of historical scholarship locates the first sustained
expressions of a discrete conception of ‘the West’ in the late-nineteenth century
(Aydin 2007, 40; Bonnett 2017, 11, 14–39; Buzan and Lawson 2015, 118–24; C.
GoGwilt 1998, 220–26; Jackson 2006, 72–111; Osterhammel 2014, 86–87; Zarakol
2011, 47–48).2
Drawing on the core premises of UCD, I propose a theory of geocultural
feedback to explain this process of transition, historicise the language of
Western civilisation, and locate the global and geopolitical sources of modern
geocultural development. On this basis, I rethink the historical formation of
Western discourses and identities as a global social process rooted in the
highly uneven power structures of an emergent world economy and colonial
2 For reasons of style, the remainder of this article generally uses terms like ‘the West’ and
‘Western civilisation’ without quotation marks. However, this should not detract from the fact that
these are historically constructed categories rather than objective social or geographic identities.
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international order. This theorisation is intended to locate the sources of mod-
ern Occidentalism in a particular conjuncture of global unevenness: how the
onset of catch-up modernisation in late-industrialising societies like Russia and
Japan (cf. Gerschenkron 1962, 42–44; Skocpol 1979, 19–23), served to under-
mine existing conceptions of white, European supremacy, and thereby promote
a novel discourse of civilisational closure centred on the putative defence of the
West. This distinctively globalised experience of combined development, I argue,
brought into being a newly conceived discourse of imperilled Western suprem-
acy which reshaped prevailing conceptions of social identity and geopolitical
organisation. Against the perceived dangers of a parallel ‘Eastern’ modernisa-
tion, the notion of an exalted Western civilisation came to be viewed as a mean-
ingful locus of racial solidarity and collective identification, as many Europeans
and North Americans sought affective categories adequate to the changing
organisation of world development. It was in and through this process of geo-
cultural feedback that the language of Westernisation was imported from the dis-
course of historical backwardness forged by modernising Asian intellectuals
(Aydin 2007), and transmuted into an imperialist politics of civilisational closure
ranged against the growing power of ‘the East.’ As I shall illustrate in the third
section of the article, the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century discourse
of the defence of the West is best understood as part of a global conjuncture of
unevenness, forged in a conscious, if distorted, relation to rival forms of societal
modernisation.
Although its focus is historical, this argument has a broader contemporary
resonance. Today ‘the defence of Western civilisation’ has re-emerged as a
major component of neo-conservative ideology (Wertheim 2017). Echoing the
conceptions of civilisational decline and white supremacy which spawned the
first ideologies of Western civilisation (Drolet and Williams 2018), this ideo-
logical movement has come to play a central role in the cultural production of
combined development. In this frame, the structural rebalancing of the world
economy from ‘West’ to ‘East’ is invested with a higher symbolic significance,
fostering the polarisations of race and nationality that drive contemporary pol-
itics (Brubaker 2017). The contemporary global conjuncture is of course radic-
ally different from the late-nineteenth century, and yet, once more, the
dynamics of uneven and combined development — the juxtaposition of
China’s rapid industrial take-off with the downturn of neoliberal capitalism in
the West — have played a key role in shaping the dominant ideological clea-
vages of the time (Rosenberg and Boyle 2019). As such, geocultural feedback
can be understood as a generalisable mechanism of cultural transformation
whereby the existential conditions of unevenness unlock new ideological path-
ways centred on essentialist representations of societal difference.
2. Culture and unevenness
But why should an engagement with ‘uneven and combined development’
help to theorise the dynamics of cultural change? Trotsky, of course, coined
the idea to capture the differential temporalities of capitalist modernisation:
the peculiar asymmetries of world development, which had led Russian soci-
ety to conjoin an ‘advanced’ industrial economy with a seemingly archaic,
semi-feudal state structure (Trotsky [1932] 2017, 5). And, while he was explicit
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that Russia’s peculiar experience of combined development had been formed
‘under the influence and pressure of the higher culture from the West’
(Trotsky [1932] 2017, 334), Trotsky often wrote as if industrial capitalism were
a kind of unmediated creator of the social world. ‘Industrialization,’ on this
view, ‘is the driving force of the whole of modern culture and by this token
the only conceivable basis for socialism’ (Trotsky 1969, 145). Given this staunch
materialism, it is perhaps unsurprising that there have been relatively few
attempts to grapple with the cultural dimensions of unevenness. Indeed,
UCD’s critics have tended to label it a kind of economic reductionism blind to
the significance of culture and ideas (Hobson 2007, 2016). What, then, is its
relevance for the study of cultural change? An initial answer to this question, I
suggest, can be found in Trotsky’s own account of the nineteenth-century
experience of ‘comparative backwardness:’ the widely-felt imbalances of power
and prestige which led many Asian and Eastern European intellectuals to iden-
tify the West as a culturally and geopolitically coherent reality.
2.1. The crucible of backwardness: from ucd to the idea of the west
Among the central themes of Trotsky’s analysis of Russian history is the devel-
opmental contrast between ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ social formations
(Trotsky [1932] 2017, 4). Like other intellectuals engaged with the problematic of
late-development (Selwyn 2011; Shilliam 2009a), he viewed the experience of
relative backwardness as a generative historical condition: a ‘whip of external
necessity’ which compelled political and economic actors to ‘follow after’ more
powerful competitors; and yet, at the same time, a strange historical ‘privilege,’
given that late-comers could accelerate and modify their own developmental tra-
jectories by assimilating ‘the material and intellectual conquests of the advanced
countries’ (Trotsky [1932] 2017, 4–5). The central thrust of this analysis was that,
viewed internationally, Russian social development had been fundamentally
conditioned by the presence of the more powerful industrial societies of the
West. ‘Under the influence and the pressure of its more differentiated Western
milieu,’ Russian absolutism had been forced to confront the military and eco-
nomic advantages which accrued to the first major powers of industrial capital-
ism: Britain, France, Germany and the USA (Trotsky 1969, 41, 50–51). This was
why, in Russia, the experience of relative backwardness was such an acutely
transformative condition. It was how an autocratic Czarist state had come to act
as the agent of capitalist modernisation, establishing the preconditions for a
socialist revolution in a still semi-feudal society (Rosenberg 2019).
At a deeper theoretical level, the social foundations of this process — the per-
ceptions of societal difference engendered by a historic global power imbalance —
derived from the condition of spatio-temporal ‘unevenness,’ which Trotsky con-
ceived as the ‘most general law of the historic process’ (Trotsky [1932] 2017, 5).
The dialectical relationship between ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ developmental
spheres opens out, in Trotsky’s writings, on to a broader proposition about the tex-
ture of historical development in general. Specifically: it underscores the centrality
of historical unevenness to human social life, that is, the idea that the social world
‘contains not one but many societies’ — a multiplicity of social formations of dif-
ferent kinds and scales, marked by distinct identities and institutional forms, all
developing at different tempos (Rosenberg 2016b, 16). The implications of this
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premise are far-reaching, and other writers have demonstrated its implications for
processes of capitalist expansion and social revolution which animated Trotsky’s
theory of history (Anievas and Nişancıoglu 2015; Matin 2007). Yet the category of
unevenness not only pertains to the dynamics of economic and political develop-
ment; it also implies that the existential and intellectual circumstances of human
social life exist within a wider interactive context, made up of the coexistence of
multiple societies; and this, in turn, suggests that the process of cultural develop-
ment must also be subject to a range of internationally-generated, ‘non-internalist’,
causal and constitutive dynamics (Rosenberg 2016b, 135–41).
This formulation might appear abstract, but an initial picture of its concrete
implications can be found in Trotsky’s depiction of Russia’s distinctive idea of
the West. ‘Russian thought,’ he wrote in a 1906 reflection on the problem of
national backwardness, ‘developed under the direct pressure of the higher
thought and more developed economies of the West’ (Trotsky 1969, 41–42). The
process of uneven development dictated by Russia’s ‘external social-historical
milieu’ had not only compelled the Czarist autocracy to adopt the most
advanced systems of economic and military power (Trotsky 1969, 38); the com-
parative example of a seemingly ‘higher culture from the West’ had also engen-
dered an internal cultural opposition between ‘Slavophilism and Westernism’
that expressed the central dilemma of nineteenth-century Russian society
(Trotsky [1932] 2017, 333–34). For Trotsky, the underlying terms of these discur-
sive positions and identities, it can be inferred, derived centrally from the oppos-
ition between traditionalist and modernist strategies of national
developmentalism. For the ethos of ‘Slavophilism’ — the ‘messianism of back-
wardness’ — was a direct ideological inversion of the Muscovite strategy of
‘Europeanization’ associated with the era of Peter the Great. To the challenge
of historical backwardness, the Slavophiles offered a neo-traditionalist project of
Russian nativism that sought to resolve the crisis of Czarism through the inner
resources of ‘the people’ and ‘the Church’ (Trotsky [1932] 2017, 5–6). Thus,
shaped by the influencing pressure of a more advanced order of Western
powers, Russian society gestated a deep cultural fissure around the problem of
modernisation. The experience of historical unevenness — the juxtaposition of
development with underdevelopment, Russian society with its perceptibly more
powerful military-industrial rivals — had shaped its very categories of cultural
understanding and identity — ‘Slavophiles’ and ‘Westerners’, ‘Muscovite’ and
‘Asiatic’ (Trotsky [1932] 2017, 5–6).
In this way, it can be argued, the UCD formula builds a conception of the
international — the interactive coexistence of societies — into a general logic of
cultural development. For at its core, the idea provides an extended meditation
on the consequences of societal multiplicity for human social life as such.
Indeed, there is a deep logic of intersocietal causality running through
Trotsky’s whole account of the Russian transition: the geopolitical and eco-
nomic power differentials that constituted Czarism’s specific international
environment; the self-consciousness of comparative backwardness which fol-
lowed from these structural imbalances; the ensuing divide between
Slavophilism and Westernism as contending solutions to the crisis of absolut-
ism; the rapid and state-directed process of industrial transformation which
followed from developmental pressures and opportunities of Russia’s unique
geopolitical position; and, finally, the emergence of an advanced socialist and
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artistic culture which, drawing on the tradition of European Marxism, out-
matched many of the intellectual achievements of the West. All these dynamics
arise fundamentally from the intersocietal character of ‘world development’
(Trotsky [1928] 1996, 66). And, as Trotsky’s reflections on the origins of the
Westerner-Slavophile divide imply, this internationally-generated process of
uneven and combined development was marked by its own distinctive cultural
logic: the tensions between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ that emerged from the
crucible of Russian backwardness. As we shall see, this dichotomy was in
many ways a general feature of the intensification of global unevenness during
the nineteenth century.
There is thus every reason to try and recover the language of UCD from
the kind of economic reductionism sometimes associated with it. For, in con-
trast to the internalist theoretical schemas conceived by Weber, Durkheim and
Levi-Strauss, Trotsky’s categories of unevenness and combination contain
within them a profound argument about the intersocietal logic of cultural
change and subjectivity.
2.2. Geocultural feedback
The foregoing discussion has presented the UCD vocabulary as a resolution to
the problem of methodological internalism. Yet it does not tell us how this
potential can be generalised as a theory of sociocultural change. Before outlin-
ing the historical constitution of nineteenth-century Occidentalism, I shall
therefore sketch three constitutive dimensions of uneven and combined devel-
opment as a cultural process. I thereby propose an understanding of geocultural
feedback as an historically constituted and dynamic expression of UCD in the
field of ‘culture.’ This formulation attempts to emphasise the generative inter-
national context of historical development in a way that better incorporates the
cultural dimension of social life. Its basic tenets can be categorised under the
rubrics of identity, temporality, and mutation. More concretely: through this
discussion, I develop my argument about the historical construction of the
West as a modern social form.
2.2.1. Multiplicity and identity. The notion of historical unevenness registers the
coexistence of multiple societies: the fact that the social world comprises a
multiplicity of social entities of different kinds (Rosenberg 2013b, 582). This
feature of social existence eludes internalist conceptions of cultural develop-
ment, but, in the vocabulary of UCD, the categories of unevenness and com-
bination signify the inherently relational character of social existence. A
conception of the social world as both multiple and uneven therefore builds a
conception of cultural relationality into its core theoretical optic. It encom-
passes the idea of identity as an inherently relational phenomenon constituted
by the interactions between one social actor or group and another (Matin
2020). It locates the possibility of collective identity-formation in the constitu-
tive interface between multiple social entities and differentially constituted cul-
tural subjectivities. Inherent to the unevenness of the social world is the
capacity for social actors to identify themselves and others in relation to social
difference — ‘otherness.’ The nineteenth-century discourse of essential
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‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ civilisations reflects this deep structural condition in
historically and ideologically specific terms. It signifies the symbolic and cul-
tural dimensions of unevenness as a lived historical reality.
In concrete terms, these dimensions of historical unevenness are registered in
a vast literature on collective identity-formation. Arguably, both constructivist
(Neumann 1996) and postcolonial (Said 2003) approaches capture exactly this
relational dynamic of self- identification vis-a-vis social multiplicity. For the fact
that social agents can identify themselves according to national, ethnic, civilisa-
tional or other identity categories reflects the persistence of difference and vari-
ation as enduring features of social life. However, by locating the sources of this
sociocultural dynamic at the level of historical unevenness, the vocabulary of
UCD situates the problem of identity-formation within a broader conception
of societal development. It thus serves to locate the representational grammar of
cultural difference — race, nation, civilisation, and so on — within a deeper
understanding of the social processes and historical transformations which ren-
der such categorisations of cultural difference into viable principles of ‘vision
and division’ (Bourdieu 1985). In contrast to the claims of poststructuralist and
constructivist theorisations, for example, the nineteenth-century discourse of a
universal Western civilisation cannot be grasped simply as an ‘unintended’
‘rhetorical commonplace,’ ‘tossed up by a general mutation in discourse’ (pace
Jackson 2006, 73–74; cf. Hellmann and Herborth 2017; Vuorelma 2019). Instead,
Occidentalist discourse works in and through the racial and civilisational catego-
risations of differential development which accompanied the long-nineteenth
century rise of a deeply uneven and empire-centred world economy (Kaiwar
and Mazumdar 2003, 264). Its historical force testifies less to the arbitrariness of
geocultural representations than to the phenomenological experience of relative
backwardness and its correlatives — catch-up development, competitive mod-
ernisation, the presence of contending developmental temporalities. The specific
metageography of Occidentalism — epitomised by Yukichi Fukuzawa’s hierarchy
of ‘barbarism, semi-Enlightenment, and civilisation’ (Conrad 2012, 1019) — bears
an integral relationship to the division between ‘industrialised, industrialising,
[and] pre-industrial regions’ that emerged from the staggered expansion of
modern capitalism (Rosenberg and Boyle 2019, 36).
2.2.2. The simultaneity of the non-simultaneous. A central implication of the ‘law
of unevenness’ (Trotsky [1932] 2017, 5) is that there can be no single pattern of
historical development. ‘History does not repeat itself’ (Trotsky 1969, 52): the
coexistence of differentially developing societies means that social change oper-
ates through logics of interaction and combination whereby the transfer of
resources, ideas, and technologies from one society to another produce inher-
ently multi-linear historical trajectories (Rosenberg 2016a, 137). Trotsky used
this schema to explain how, in nineteenth-century Russia, the external influ-
ence of Western capitalism had fostered the unique combination of develop-
mental forms which had led a semi-feudal absolutist state to inadvertently
create the basis for proletarian revolution. More generally, the logic of com-
bined development registers the differentiated character of historical temporal-
ity: the intersection between ‘native’ and ‘foreign,’ ‘modern’ and ‘archaic,’ ‘the
simultaneity of the non-simultaneous’ (Bloch 1977). This conception of
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combined unevenness provides a critical route into the production and trans-
formation of cultural forms. Against the logic of national and civilisational
exceptionalisms, it draws attention to processes of intellectual exchange, cross-
cultural comparison, mimesis and knowledge transfer as potentially recurrent
mechanisms of cultural development. In these terms, the nineteenth-century
proliferation of Westernisation discourses — especially in societies such as
Russia and Japan — hinged on the perceived necessity of emulating the most
advanced forms of economic and military technology in order to overcome the
power and status differentials inscribed in the emergent international order
(Osterhammel 2014, 912). They register a widely-felt experience of temporal
disjunction: the need to transcend ‘traditional’ social orders by catching up
with the forerunners of capitalist modernity.
2.2.3. The dynamics of geocultural feedback. The larger point here is that the UCD
vocabulary suggests a specifically international conception of cultural develop-
ment as an intersocietal, multilinear, and interactive historical process. This
dialectical conception of cultural change responds to the problem of methodo-
logical internalism by incorporating the condition of internationality into its
core theoretic categories. Through the historical analysis sketched below, I find
a broader expression of the process of uneven and combined development in
the dynamics of geocultural feedback through which putatively ‘Western’ and
‘non-Western’ societies engaged in mutually transformative processes of self-
definition, social restructuring, and intellectual innovation. As conceptualised
here, geocultural feedback was the symbolic and ideological counterpart to the
long-nineteenth century intensification of global unevenness. In this context,
the increasingly dense interactions between unevenly developed societies
helped engender novel imaginings of Western civilisation through an intrinsic-
ally intersocietal causal process. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the
experience of relative backwardness in late-industrialising societies began to
translate into self-consciously Westernising projects of catch-up development,
which aimed at shifting the global distribution of modern geopolitical and eco-
nomic power, and undermined prevailing conceptions of European cultural
supremacy. The feedback-effect of these ‘Eastern’ projects of self-strengthening
and social modernisation, epitomised by the self-strengthening efforts of late-
nineteenth century Russia and Japan, gradually shaped a reactive discourse of
civilisational closure centred on the West’s struggle against a rising force of
geostrategic and racial challengers, manifesting the emergent conjuncture of
uneven and combined development in a novel cultural form.
3. Occidentalism in the history of uneven and combined development
It now comes to reconstruct the pathways of historical transformation and cul-
tural change that have been hinted at so far. To this end, I shall first examine
how the idea of Western civilisation figured in nineteenth-century debates
about the problem of relative backwardness, before illustrating the reactive
politics of civilisational closure which began to crystallise the discourse of an
imperilled West during the fin-de-siecle era of the New Imperialism.
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3.1. Unevenness: the origins of ‘westernisation’
The intense opposition between ‘Westernism’ and ‘Slavophilism’ that marked
Trotsky’s diagnosis of Russian historical development may seem peculiar and
idiosyncratic. Yet a wide range of historical scholarship (GoGwilt 1998, 226ff;
Heller 2006, 150; Osterhammel 2014, 616, 912–13; Makdisi 2014, xv; Aydin
2007, 3), and social science (Zarakol 2011, 42–49; Buzan and Lawson 2015,
25–28), suggests that exactly this equation between ‘Westernisation’ and
‘modernity’ was a general feature of nineteenth-century cultural change —
especially in those societies where the experience of relative backwardness was
most acute. In particular, it is now clear that East Asian, Ottoman, and Russian
intellectual production played a key role in fostering the logics inter-cultural
comparison that helped the transform the West into a standard frame of refer-
ence (Bonnett 2017, 63–122; Carrier 1995; Duara 2001; Esenbel 2004). Among
the most important works of this kind, Aydin’s (2007) study of Pan-Islamic
and Pan-Asian thought demonstrates that the idea of a distinctively Occidental
mode of social and political organisation was initially the creation of mid-nine-
teenth century Asian intellectuals, whose interest in the imagined West arose
from a shared, post-Enlightenment project of progressive social transformation
(Aydin 2007, 21–37). With the intensification of European imperialism after
c.1880, such positive conceptions of Western culture were gradually inverted,
as both Japanese and Ottoman nationalists began to view ‘European-modelled
modernisation projects’ as an urgent geopolitical imperative (Aydin 2007,
73–77, 104).
Influential Japanese academic Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901), for example,
argued that ‘backward-looking’ societies would be condemned to colonisation if
they failed to adopt Western models of social development (Bonnett 2005, 512).
Even more strikingly, Yukichi’s 1885 essay on ‘De-Asianization’ emphasised that
‘our country cannot afford to wait for the enlightenment of our neighbours and
to co-operate in building Asia up. Rather, we should leave their ranks to join
the camp of the civilised countries of the West.’ Therefore, he asserted, Japan
should treat its Chinese and Korean neighbours ‘as the Westerners do’ (cited in:
Conrad 2012, 1022). It was this reaction against relative backwardness, epitom-
ised by the competitive emulation of Western models, that set Japan on route to
an aggressive strategy of imperial expansion in the aftermath of the Meiji
Restoration (Peattie 1984, 94–94; Shimazu 2008, 161ff; Tsuzuki 2000, ch.6). While
this process set Russia and Japan on a course for war in 1904–5, it reflected the
same perceptions of national backwardness that had been articulated in the
‘Westerner-Slavophile’ debate of the early-nineteenth century.
Across the world, the themes of ‘Westernisation’ and ‘relative backwardness’
thus evolved together, shaping a novel opposition between ‘traditionalists’ —
whether Russian Slavophiles or orthodox Confucians — and ‘modernisers’
(Osterhammel 2014, 93, 188, 625–28). The reverberations of this movement were
widely-felt across Europe and the United States, where the idea of a backward
yet gradually ascending ‘East’ became an increasingly central theme of political
discourse as the nineteenth century progressed (Adamovsky 2005; Bavaj 2011).
As GoGwilt’s (1995) seminal genealogy of Western discourse makes clear, it was
only in the period after c.1870 —i.e. when the competitive thrust of ‘Eastern’
catch-up development was just beginning to emerge — that European and
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North American intellectuals began to converge around a shared sense of the
West as a coherent cultural reality (GoGwilt 1995, 47ff). Among the central
markers of this discourse was the proliferation of ‘decline-and-fall’ accounts of
Western civilisation, made famous by Oswald Spengler, and typical among the
intellectual milieu of the 1890s and 1900s (GoGwilt 1995, 54; Heller 2006, 273).
In the words of the influential American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan,
a ‘new and significant restlessness’ was emerging ‘among the Oriental peoples,
aroused at length, by intimate contact with Europeans, from the torpor and
changelessness of ages;’ the ‘new era of colonization’ was thus marked by a
growing confrontation between ‘the East and the West’ (Mahan 1902a, 31;
1902b, 217).
Now, for the first, time the organisation of the globe could be described
through a series of metaphorical distinctions, famously recorded by Rudyard
Kipling, whose abstractions articulated a new sense of geopolitical division —
‘East is East and West is West,’ ‘Somewhere East of Suez,’ ‘the white man’s
burden’ (GoGwilt 1995, 2000, 89, 143). These formulations, it should be
emphasised, drew on a distinctively late nineteenth-century worldview suf-
fused by the emergent discourses of Social Darwinism and ‘race science’
(Hung 2003, 268–74). The hierarchical conceptions of cultural difference associ-
ated with modern Occidentalism (Coronil 1996, 56–57) thus crystallised around
the themes of civilisational decline and racial-geopolitical competition. In the
words of Charles Pearson, a key architect of Anglo-American anti-Japanese
propaganda (Hobson 2012, 87ff), ‘the day was probably not far distant when
we would see the races of our Western civilisation … in a large measure
superseded by the yellow races of the world’ (Jones 2001, 95). This, for
example, was how Theodore Roosevelt, a frequent correspondent of Kipling
and his British-imperial milieu (Dyer 1992), characterised the civilisational
order of the early-twentieth century:
The lines of development of these two civilisations, of the Orient and the
Occident, have been separate and divergent since thousands of years before
the Christian era…An effort to mix together, out of hand, the peoples repre-
senting the culminating points of two such lines of divergent cultural develop-
ment would be fraught with peril (Roosevelt 1914, 306).
In all of these cases, the notion of the West helped historical actors to think
in global terms about the problems of comparative backwardness generated by
an unprecedented concentration of power in North Western Europe and North
America (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 176). Absent from eighteenth-century repre-
sentations of Asia and Eastern Europe, such as those produced in the context
of the Scottish Enlightenment or the European Romanticism (Adamovsky 2005;
P. Dodds 2018, 60; Hung 2003; Makdisi 1998), the West could now be figured
as the universal standard of modernity within a profoundly uneven inter-
national order (Zarakol 2011, 91). While earlier forms of European colonialism
had, of course, gestated their own ideologies of civilisational and cultural
supremacy, this nineteenth-century discourse of Westernisation rested on a
configuration of global power which had not existed prior to the post-1800 era.
More specifically, forged in a conscious relation to the rising power of ‘the
East,’ the self-valorising discourse of Western civilisation was replete with anx-
ious references to the threat of racial and geopolitical counter-powers. Its dis-
tinctiveness not only derives from the newly conceived image of a
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homogenous Western world, but from the ways in which this imagined geo-
political sphere was now envisaged as the site and object of strategic competi-
tion and cultural crisis. It was in these defensive terms that Oswald Spengler,
the fin-de-siecle’s most famous Westerniser, characterised the Bolshevik
Revolution as an alien threat to West. Drawing explicitly on the Slavophile
conception of a native Russian instinct, Spengler developed an Orientalist con-
struction of ‘Mother Russia’ as a direct counterpoint to Western civilisation:
The word ‘Europe’ ought to be struck out of history. There is historically
no ‘European’ type… It is thanks to this word ‘Europe’ alone, and the com-
plex of ideas resulting from it, that our historical consciousness has come to
link Russia with the West in an utterly baseless unity — a mere abstraction
derived from the reading of books — that has led to immense real consequen-
ces. In the shape of Peter the Great, this word has falsified the historical ten-
dencies of a primitive human mass for two centuries, whereas the Russian
instinct has very truly and fundamentally divided ‘Europe’ from ‘Mother
Russia’ with the hostility that we can see embodied in Tolstoi, Aksakov, or
Dostoyevsky. ‘East’ and ‘West’ are notions that contain real history, whereas
‘Europe’ is an empty sound (cited in GoGwilt, 1995, 50).
In a major world-historical irony, even the most self-consciously internalist
conception of Western civilisation turns out to be a kind of imported cultural
hybrid, indebted to the ‘Slavophile-Westerner’ debate of the early-nineteenth
century. This point should be emphasised: the image of the West is historically
conditioned, determined, and brought into being by the influence and pressure
of its external milieu.
3.2. Combination: the rise of civilisational imperialism
With Spengler’s ‘West,’ we find a very different cultural universe to that of the
early-nineteenth century. Published in two volumes between 1918 and 1922,
The Decline of the West appeared in the aftermath of the First World War and
the decades of global imperialism which preceded it. In a time of growing
class and geopolitical antagonism, the universalistic worldviews of earlier lib-
eral and romanticist political cultures had been increasingly superseded by an
ideological amalgam of Social Darwinism, white supremacy, and expansionist
geopolitics (Anderson 2002, 12; Mommsen 1990, 210–26). These were essen-
tially ideologies of imperial competition, fixated on the rivalry between
nations, races and civilisational groupings — Slavic, Asiatic, Anglo-Saxon and
so on (Hobson 2012, 106ff; Heffernan 2000, 27–51; Geulen 2007, 70–78; Bayly
2004, 462–67). Spengler crystallised a conception of Western civilisation which
had been evolving since the 1880s (GoGwilt 1995, 44).
Among the most influential figures in this Occidentalist turn was the
British sociologist Benjamin Kidd. His 1894 work Social Evolution cast the
expansion of ‘Western civilisation’ as a ‘single continuous growth’ culminating
in the ‘absolutely unique’ intellectual achievements of the ‘Western races’ dur-
ing the European ‘Renaissance’ (Kidd 1894, 147, 186). The centrality of scien-
tific racism to this formula was clear in Kidd’s view of the ‘Anglo-Saxon races’
as a uniquely ‘progressive peoples’ characterised by their superior energy, vir-
ility and ingenuity (Kidd 1894, 55–56). This social-Darwinian perspective
located the sources of Western ‘progress’ in the ‘the rivalry of life’ which
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European and North American forms of social organisation had allowed to
rise to ‘the highest possible degree of efficiency (Kidd 1894, 142). In the
‘Eastern’ world, by contrast, the stultifying institutions of caste and despotism
had prevented such competitive urges from achieving their natural dynamism:
In Eastern countries where the institution of caste still prevails, we have,
indeed, only an example of a condition of society in which (in the absence of
that developmental force which we shall have to observe at work amongst
ourselves) these groups and classes have become fixed and rigid, and in
which, consequently, progress has been thwarted and impeded at every turn
by innumerable barriers which have for ages prevented that free conflict of
forces with the community which has made so powerfully for progress among
the Western peoples (Kidd 1894, 142).
In parallel, the Oxford-based Indologist Friedrich Max M€uller deployed the
evolutionary paradigm as a replacement for older Orientalist theories of com-
parative religion, emphasising the essential backwardness of all non-European
cultures (Hung 2003, 269). This Occidentalist schema located the ‘complete
break between East and West’ in the cultural divisions of the prehistoric
period, and emphasised the essential contrast between ‘the white and dark
men, the Aryan and the Semite’ (M€uller 1893, 8–9). In a similar vein to Kidd’s
Anglo-Saxonism, M€uller (1893, 36) celebrated ‘the thousands of Englishmen
ruling the millions of human beings in India, in Africa, in the Americas, and
in Australasia’ — an achievement which had ‘more than realised the dream of
Alexander, the marriage of the East and the West.’
However, such fantasies of ‘Western’ civilisational supremacy were predi-
cated on an inherently unstable assumption of permanent ‘Eastern’ backward-
ness. As previously argued, the original ‘Eastern’ conception of ‘Westernisation’
was centrally a modernising discourse of catch-up developmentalism. In a world
of uneven and combined development, where societies could leverage the
achievements of more ‘advanced countries’ to ‘make leaps’ ‘under the whip of
external necessity’ (Trotsky [1932] 2017, 5), the power imbalances which divided
‘East’ from ‘West’ were potentially reversible. Thus, underlying the fin-de-siecle
discourse of Western supremacy, we find a latent series of anxieties about social
decadence and civilisational decline. This discourse, as Dirk B€onker’s (2016)
study of American naval strategy suggests, had a hard geopolitical dimension
rooted in the strategic challenge of both Russian and Japanese expansionism
(B€onker 2016, 33–46, 90–91, 117, 240ff). Typical of this outlook was the argument
of US Rear-Admiral Bradley Fiske that the imitation of advanced industrial and
military techniques by states like Imperial Japan was generating an increasingly
competitive international environment — and thus, with the ‘opening of
undeveloped countries,’ the expansion of world trade was producing ‘a stupen-
dous competition involving, in a vast and complicated net, every red blooded
nation of the earth’ (Fiske 1911, 706, 709).
Echoing these concerns about Japanese-style catch-up development, Alfred
Thayer Mahan warned that ‘Europe civilisation’ would ‘not survive’ if it failed
to sustain its competitive edge over the barbarian world:
In this our day, the development of the world may be said to present two
principal factors: European civilisation, and the civilisations, or barbarisms, as
the case may be, which are not European in origin… In the future processes
of adjustment, in which we doubtless shall see the superior organisation of
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European civilisation imitated as it has been successfully in Japan, it is of the
first importance that the European family of states retain in full the power of
national self-assertion, of which the sentiment of nationality is the spirit and
armaments the embodiment (Mahan 1911, 8–9).
In this way, the ‘occidentalizing of Japan’ had exposed the civilised West to
economic and strategic pressures that it would now have to contend with geo-
politically (Mahan 1902a, 31).
In this context, it the idea of an imperilled Western civilisation became a
major theme of conservative anxieties about social decadence (GoGwilt 1995,
53). For both these ideological motifs — decadence and declinism — articu-
lated concerns about the erasure of imperial standing during an era of growing
international competition. In response, British imperial statesmen like Arthur J.
Balfour and Alfred Milner, developed protectionist conceptions of imperial
federation that drew heavily on the imagined connections between ‘race,’
‘progress’ and ‘the West’ (Balfour 1908, 27, 42; Milner 1909, 18,56–57, 83). The
proliferation and intersection of these identity categories was a striking feature
of the fin-de-siecle.
Thus, a wider explanation for the imperial ideology of Western civilisation
begins to emerge. It rests on the dynamics of geocultural feedback through
which nineteenth-century societies like Russia and Japan, Britain and the
United States, became entwined within a broader logic of world development.
This process begins with the condition of historical unevenness — the develop-
mental power gaps fostered by the regional distribution of the first Industrial
Revolution. These power differentials were the locus for a modernising dis-
course of Westernisation that reflected the desire of late-developing societies to
overcome the problems of historical backwardness. Yet, through the resulting
process of intensified, catch-up development, the comparative light of the East
made it possible to envisage a future process of civilisational decline. This
interpretation would explain why it was only at the turn of the nineteenth to
the twentieth century, in response to the apparent dangers of ‘Eastern’ self-
strenghtening, that such a defensive conception of Western chauvinism became
a pervasive discourse of collective identification. This shift not only reflected
the external pressures imparted by the rise of a new set of global competitors.
The fantasy of civilisational closure provided by Western imaginings of a static
and backward East also offered an appealing prospect of geopolitical stability
which promised to insulate the West from the destabilising impact of catch-up
development elsewhere. It was this unstable relationship to the ‘non-West’
which shaped the fin-de-siecle transition toward a deeply pessimistic discourse
of racial conflict and civilisational rivalry. In an effort to overcome the anxi-
eties engendered by an increasingly unstable and multipolar geopolitical envir-
onment, many Anglo-American observers turned to a defensive discourse of
the Western race’s struggle to maintain the prevailing imperial order. The pro-
spect of a radical rupture in the overall balance of geostrategic power thus set
the mould for a new cultural understanding of the West, defined less by the
universal goals human enlightenment than the defence of a bounded racial-
political community:
Progress is with the West: with communities of the European type. And if
their energy of development is some day to be exhausted, who can believe
that there remains any external source from which it can be renewed? Where
Geoculture and unevenness 15
are the untried races competent to construct out of the ruined fragments of our
civilisation a new and better habitation for the spirit of man?’ (Balfour
1908, 42).
4. Conclusion
While it was originally coined to describe the international dynamics of capitalist
development, this article has argued that, as a historical process, uneven and
combined development contains a distinct cultural dimension, in which the inter-
active multiplicity of societies constitutes and shapes socially shared ideas and
collective mentalities. By examining Trotsky’s account of Russia’s late-industrial-
isation, it has shown how this conception of cultural change can be derived from
the concepts of historical unevenness and combined development that underpin
the UCD vocabulary. On this basis, it has elaborated a theoretical conception of
geocultural feedback which, against the wider problem of methodological inter-
nalism, can properly access the causal and constitutive dynamics of ‘the inter-
national’ as a major source of cultural transformation. Applied to the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century conjuncture of the New Imperialism, this
theoretical perspective provides a historical-sociological explanation for the
emergence of the idea of the West as a unified cultural entity: how a modernising
discourse of Westernisation was first gestated in late-industrialising societies like
Russia and Japan, and then subsequently transformed into a defensive discourse
of civilisational closure by Anglo-American intellectuals’ anxious response to the
geopolitical rise of such late-developers. It is deeply ironic that the very idea of
the West — a self-consciously internalist cultural ideology — should turn out to
be a fundamentally intersocietal phenomenon. However, there is a striking his-
torical parallel between the ongoing re-emergence of the language of Western civ-
ilisation within neoconservative political discourse, on the one hand, and the
origins of the idea in the late-nineteenth century imperial era, on the other. Once
again the destabilising consequences of uneven and combined development have
engendered a defensive ideological stance centred on the putative characteristics
of the West. How to think through this feature of contemporary international pol-
itics remains a politically and theoretically urgent challenge. A reworked concep-
tion of UCD as a culturally generative process represents an initial step in this
larger task.
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